Afganistan goes down the Kharzi.

[Verbal]

The pretence that the Taliban are 'foreigners' and do not consist in the vast majority of Afganis is laughable.

The Taliban just want to be loved. Is that so wrong?

[Sickbag]

The pretence that the Taliban are 'foreigners' and do not consist in the vast majority of Afganis is laughable.

The Taliban just want to be loved. Is that so wrong?

Maybe we should play Barney's ' I love you' at them for 48 hours non stop.

[David Hilditch]

David, you can't blame the Afghani people. They would dearly like peace and prosperity, and they are not too keen on all these foreigners flying the Taliban flag coming into their country any more than they like NATO/US (Coalition) boots tromping through their gardens. They probably could be convinced to trust the coalition IF there was a guarantee that the US and NATO wasn't about to pack up their bongoes and go home in a few years. Then the taleban will come down out of the hills and kill any villager that co-operated with the US or NATO. The villagers know who the taleban are, and should be the eyes and ears of the coalition forces (after all its their country). Basically with nowhere to hide and their locations being reported to the coalition the taleban would have a massively harder time. BUT given that Afg has been fought over for over 100 years - no tribal elder or Afghani worth his salt is going to assist the coalition because he knows the coalition won't stay long (just like the soviets) and then the retributions will start, and in that part of the world people have long memories.

This is why for this to be a serious endeavour a commitment of maybe 40 years is needed. Plus the troops need to be outside the mobile armoured pillboxes (MRAP's) and on foot. If you were an Afghani, you would find it very difficult to interact and form a friendship with a bunch of vehicles that go shooting through your village. Of course, short term this will mean more casualties as the troops are far less protected, but longer term as the bonds develop with the local population, confidence increases and the enemy start to lose as the coalition has won the hearts and minds of the population. These techniques and ideas are nothing new, Dr David Killcullen (he was a Platoon Commander with me at 5/7 RAR (Mech)) has been advising your DoD on this for a while now. It's not rocket science - but to work, it will require more men, more casualties more money and more time. And that is politically unpalatable, so it will not happen.

I agree with most of this. I’m not blaming the Afghan people. They are acting rationally, as I was actually suggesting in my previous post. I myself doubt that even a 40-year “Marshall plan” type of program would add much to Afghanistan based on what I have seen, heard, learned and read, mainly because the lack of civil society and the fissile tribalism of the country are just too overwhelming. But that’s academic.

In the real world I don’t get any sense that anyone wants to be in this for more than 3 to 5 years at the outside, and ideally for much less. We want to find an exit strategy than can be spun as honorable. Our approach now is likely a smorgasbord of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, training, trade and aid, stick and carrot, but (I think) will also include more localized tactics, which may (as I previously said) involve attempts to engage with more moderate Taleban elements (cf. “Sunni awakening” in Iraq). Existing policies face obstacles too demanding for the Western mindset, especially given recent disillusionment with the shenanigans of the Karzai government.

I am very familiar with Kilcullen and his work. I have seen for myself some local programs which do add value to people’s lives, their villages and their businesses. But, as so often in developing countries, these kind of gains are too localized to make a major difference on a ‘macro’ level. Moreover, the Taleban and their tribal and political backers in many provinces often cynically use such Western aid to their own advantage. Programs are also applied too thinly due to lack of resources and personnel, and we have no political will at home to counter lack of civil society on a country-wide basis. There is also a huge misallocation of resources for the military versus civilian personnel and investment.

This gets at the whole issue of what indeed is the “mission” in Afghanistan. In and of itself, few people care a dime about Afghanistan and its people, but we are told we are there to keep us safe at home. I believe there are still threats to the West from continued instability in so-called “AfPak” as a whole. Yet, the cost-benefit of continuing what we are doing there, never mind ramping it up further, may not be in our favor, not least as threats to us exist from many other theatres, including rising domestic US Islamist (and maybe other) terrorism.

[David Hilditch]

David, you can't blame the Afghani people. They would dearly like peace and prosperity, and they are not too keen on all these foreigners flying the Taliban flag coming into their country any more than they like NATO/US (Coalition) boots tromping through their gardens.

The pretence that the Taliban are 'foreigners' and do not consist in the vast majority of Afganis is laughable.

You are quite right. But what he may be getting at is the motley crew of foreigners and fellow-travelers who hitch their wagons to the Taleban’s, eg. Uzbeks, Tajiks, various Arabs, Uighurs, Pakistanis, even sometimes Westerners. The Taleban are home-grown and are probably now a fixture in Afghan politics. The Taleban is a highly elastic grouping, taking in people with differing levels of radicalism. People become Talebanis when it suits them and then change back, depending on the audience. Karzai himself has had (maybe still has) tenuous links with them, but we’re not allowed to talk about that now.

[Marc 1]

David, you can't blame the Afghani people. They would dearly like peace and prosperity, and they are not too keen on all these foreigners flying the Taliban flag coming into their country any more than they like NATO/US (Coalition) boots tromping through their gardens.

The pretence that the Taliban are 'foreigners' and do not consist in the vast majority of Afganis is laughable.

Depending on the region, a great many of them are.

[Not_Karl]

Maybe we should play Barney's ' I love you' at them for 48 hours non stop.

That would convert anyone into a suicidal terrorist...

[rattler]

Anybody here actually been there?

Rattler

[David Hilditch]

Anybody here actually been there?

Rattler

Yes.

[Sabre]

Anybody here actually been there?

Rattler

Yes.

flyboy2548m will appreciate the brevity.

[Peter_K]

Anybody here actually been there?

Rattler

No, but I've seen Rambo III so I know all about it.

[rattler]

Check on my comment and input in another forum, I would really like to hear your comments, on both issues/opinions:

http://www.warandtactics.com/smf/afghan ... /#msg11186

Rattler

[David Hilditch]

Check on my comment and input in another forum, I would really like to hear your comments, on both issues/opinions:

http://www.warandtactics.com/smf/afghan ... /#msg11186

Rattler

I'm not sure what it is you're asking.

It is not news that the Afghan army can sometimes fight effectively. The trouble is that this ability cannot always be relied on - many are 'part-time' and under-paid, and their loyalty can be slippery depending on where they see the balance of advantage. However, they are a reasonably useful resource viewed on an overall national level. They are also, I might add, cannon fodder for where Western forces can't or won't go.

The real problem is with the police and the civilian law enforcement institutional support infrastructure. This lot are mostly craven, ineffective, unwilling, incapable, illiterate and corrupt.

[Pipe]

Anybody here actually been there?

Rattler

Yep.

That´s why I´m telling you to forget all the BS about what to do and what not. Afghan is a lost case, it always has been, it always will be. There´s nothing a western mind can grasp. The tribes will settle their business, with or without western presence. Strategy and tactics discussions are smokescreens.

Pipe

[rattler]

someone here had it right: "its beyond parody".

Make Mullah Omar an ally, instead of persecuting him and his ideas, only the Afghani ppl themselves can make him go (and will, as we all know from whatver history about restricitve regimes). My bet: If you have a dynamite collar aruound his neck (triggered by pushing a button somewhere in the US, offering him absolute freedom of actions in A´stan IF, and only IF - the button! - he kicks Al quaedas ass, what do you think will happen? He will buy it and be th best ally you have (better thean the Paks) until the Afghanis get sick of Taliban ideas.

Rattler

[David Hilditch]

Make Mullah Omar an ally,.....

He was our (ie. the West's) ally in the 1990s, so what's new. The more things change, the more they stay the same.

[Sickbag]

President Obama's visit to Kabul last week, intended in part to forge a closer working relationship with President Hamid Karzai, has helped produce the opposite: an angry Afghan leader now attacking the West for what he perceives as an effort to manipulate him and weaken his rule.

Karzai's relationship with his U.S. backers in the past week has taken a sharp turn for the worse after his two anti-Western speeches in three days, remarks that some officials see as a rehearsed, intentional move away from the United States.

In remarks to parliament members Saturday, Karzai said that if foreign interference in his government continues, the Taliban would become a legitimate resistance -- one that he might even join, according to lawmakers present.

"When I heard Karzai's remarks, it really shocked me. It scared me," a senior Afghan official who works closely with Karzai said. "We should not take this lightly. This is a golden opportunity to have the West here; we can't squander it."


...Karzai's first speech on Thursday harshly criticized foreigners and the United Nations for conspiring to weaken his government and accused foreign embassies of orchestrating the voting fraud. This caused a diplomatic uproar that was quelled only during Karzai's phone call to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton the next day, in which he expressed his commitment to their partnership.

But the next day, Karzai told a gathering of lawmakers that foreign interference fuels the insurgency. One lawmaker said Karzai made the point that if he is compelled to obey foreigners, "I'll join the Taliban."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... 71_pf.html

Wow , Obama's personal visit seems to really have made an impression on karzi!

[Verbal]

Karzai's first speech on Thursday harshly criticized foreigners and the United Nations for conspiring to weaken his government and accused foreign embassies of orchestrating the voting fraud.

A conspiracy! I knew it! Time for Mr. Karzai to put on his tinfoil hat.

P.S. Who is karzi?

[David Hilditch]

History tells us that over the past 2000 years the Afghans rid themselves of invaders by making their stay too costly. We too are perceived as invaders by many skeptical Afghans, Taleban and non-Taleban alike. Back in 2001 we initially made inroads through impressive airpower accuracy and the Taliban's unwillingness to engage in pitched battles. But we blew it, and believed Karzai’s flattery and soft soap, just as we did with people like Chalabi or Musharraf. Same old, same old. Some Taleban were bought off, some were persuaded or paid not to fight, while most just melted into their streets, towns, tribes and families where they remain today, emerging to ‘fight’ when it suits them, eg.post-conflict Marja.

We may be able to shoot straight, but can we build a nation with a corrupt and morally bankrupt central government ? The problem is that Karzai is now the elected (and if not legitimate then at least recognized) leader of Afghanistan for another 5 years, so we either have to get with his program or get out. Otherwise we will likely suffer heavy losses.

(The other way to see Karzai, just maybe, is that [given his own established strong Taleban sympathies due to tribal and historic links] he may be trying to reconcile his administration with Talebani elements in the wider interests of peace and governability, which helps to support American strategy. OK, maybe not, it was just a thought.)

[Sickbag]

can we build a nation with a corrupt and morally bankrupt central government ?

When the builders themselves are corrupt and morally bankrupt? No, they just create a mirror to their hypocrisy.

[Sickbag]

Seems like the race is on as to who can cut a deal with the Taliban first, Washington or their puppet Karzai .
The winner gets to cut the other out
amazing.

[David Hilditch]

can we build a nation with a corrupt and morally bankrupt central government ?

When the builders themselves are corrupt and morally bankrupt? No, they just create a mirror to their hypocrisy.

Well, yes, there's some of that, though I prefer the cock-up theory rather than the conspiracy theory of history. There's a lot more incompetence and naivete in American foreign policy than conspiracy or corruption. Americans tend to be somewhat tone-deaf to their impact on the rest of the world. A further point is that, despite the US being a country containing people with huge intellectual resources, the widest of knowledge and experience, there's something that prevents the best people from making careers in public policy-making and in the executive and (especially) the legislative branches of government.

But you shouldn’t over-estimate the willingness of the US to support authoritarian regimes out of base or corrupt motivations. Take this week’s Exhibit A : Kyrgyzstan. We did after all support Bakiyev in 2005 when he overthrew the previous guy, who was then far more “our guy”. We were thrown out of next door Uzbekistan some years ago because we would not support “our guy” there. The US is still putting in a great deal of resources and effort in terms of direct aid, university exchanges and via wealthy private individuals/hedge funds into many such dubious countries. Could more be done ? Of course, but more is being done in this direction than almost any other major country with interests in this region. Not much of it is effective, unfortunately, on a macro-level, but the motives are rarely as base as you may believe.

[Sickbag]

Americans tend to be somewhat tone-deaf to their impact on the rest of the world. A further point is that, despite the US being a country containing people with huge intellectual resources, the widest of knowledge and experience, there's something that prevents the best people from making careers in public policy-making and in the executive and (especially) the legislative branches of government.

Well they certainly don't end up in the CIA.

[Verbal]

A further point is that, despite the US being a country containing people with huge intellectual resources, the widest of knowledge and experience, there's something that prevents the best people from making careers in public policy-making and in the executive and (especially) the legislative branches of government.

I would go one more step and say that the system works specifically to prevent the best and brightest from serving in the public sector.

[Marc 1]

A further point is that, despite the US being a country containing people with huge intellectual resources, the widest of knowledge and experience, there's something that prevents the best people from making careers in public policy-making and in the executive and (especially) the legislative branches of government.

I would go one more step and say that the system works specifically to prevent the best and brightest from serving in the public sector.

Not an accusation exclusive to America either.