UPS A300 crash Birmingham AL

[Verbal]

Both crew member perished. Cheap composites strike again.

http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/14/us/alabam ... ?hpt=hp_t1

[3WE]

A lot of problems landing big planes these days...

Maybe we're so focused on stabilized approaches that we can't handle things if they are off a little bit?

[Sir Gallivant]

and when is 'a little bit' suddenly 'too much' off to be corrected by anything but a missed approach?

[3WE]

When?

When you break something.

[Sir Gallivant]

And then you haven't been ahead of the aircraft and realized that your were heading into dangerous territory. The problem lies in the ability/willingness to reach that realization and do the only prudent thing, go around. Hunting the landing is not a sound principle, and sometimes you just have to realize that another attempt is needed. If you have to be convinced by a fender-bender or worse, then you have neglected to act on all available information and training.

It is, however, in the human nature to try to avoid losing face, and some see a go-around as a loss of face since you didn't get the approach set up properly in the first place. Eat it and go around, and get to fly another day.

I have no idea if any of this has anything to do with this accident, though.

[J]

Flight Data Recorders Recovered - article with photographs

BIRMINGHAM, Ala. — Investigators have recovered the flight recorders from the wreckage of a UPS jet that crashed at Birmingham's airport, killing two pilots. National Transportation Safety Board spokesman Eric Weiss says the devices were found but declined to elaborate. Investigators had been combing the tail section of the plane, which is where the recorders are usually located. Late Thursday morning, a reporter observed an investigator carrying a box-like object from the tail section. Investigators gathered around it for a moment, then put it on an ATV and left without commenting. The two devices could hold key evidence about what happened as the jet was attempting to land in Birmingham early Wednesday. The plane slammed into a hillside just short of the runway. A news conference was scheduled for Thursday afternoon. -

http://bostonherald.com/news_opinion/na ... lane_crash

[3WE]

Parlour talk moment...

Was this crash pre-dawn?

I'm thinking of the black hole effect which unfortunately seems to happen from time to time. You have only runway lights in a sea of blackness (didn't see approach lights depicted on the approach plates, AND we have the photographs of the barren field) and you think you are on a good approach path, but you get low.

(Yes, you are supposed to watch the altimiter too, but tell that to all of the pilots who have crashed before)

[ocelot]

Maybe we're so focused on stabilized approaches that we can't handle things if they are off a little bit?

Uh..... no......?

[3WE]

The NTSB now reports that the autopilot was on until "the final second" before impact (autothrottles also engaged until the final few seconds).

...and low clouds and rain in the area.

(Along with a call out of "Runway in sight" 4 seconds before impact.)

Parlour talk: Old fashoined botched altitude management on a non-precision instrument approach in moderate?/severe? IMC with hilly, above-the-runway topagraphy and a "not-normally-used" runway as contributing factors...

[PurduePilot]

Parlour talk moment...

Was this crash pre-dawn?

I'm thinking of the black hole effect which unfortunately seems to happen from time to time. You have only runway lights in a sea of blackness (didn't see approach lights depicted on the approach plates, AND we have the photographs of the barren field) and you think you are on a good approach path, but you get low.

(Yes, you are supposed to watch the altimiter too, but tell that to all of the pilots who have crashed before)

Yep that almost got me a few days ago coming back into Renton where Lake Washington goes nearly to the threshold of 16. It was my first night landing in probably 2 years (late dusk, really). Even though there are some surface lights from the nearby community I still somehow found myself 200 yards out and 2 reds without any real idea of what was between me and the runway (just water? Or was there a sailboat or maybe some tall pilings near the shore?). The scariest part was how surprised I was to see the 2 reds since I had been mostly focused on the runway sight picture up to that point, which didn't appear really abnormal. Time to pour on the coal and try again.

[Marc 1]

Time to pour on the coal and try again.

Pussy. You would never make it in asia.

[3WE]

Time to pour on the coal and try again.

Pussy. You would never make it in asia.

His name is no longer "Brad".

It's "No Bang Phuoc".

[ocelot]

Which autopilot functions? If the autopilot was handling the glideslope at the time the GPWS called "sink rate", that pretty much rules out lack of stick and rudder skills or issues caused by handflying a nonprecision approach while fatigued. Instead there's the possibility they set the autopilot wrong; or a major mechanical, like engines not responding to throttle. If it wasn't, this doesn't tell us much.

I suppose I should go rake up what the NTSB reported instead of relying on 3WE.

The GPWS "sink rate" callout, BTW, is triggered by barometric vertical speed. Flying on a normal glideslope into the hilltop would (AIUI) cause "terrain". This seems like a possibly important point.

[PurduePilot]

Time to pour on the coal and try again.

Pussy. You would never make it in asia.

Sorry I can't afford a 182 right now.

[flyboy2548m]

This is an interesting accident.

When I first heard that they crashed just North of Rwy 18, that jumped right out. I've been in and out of BHM probably some 30 times, and never saw ANYONE (not even GA) land on 18. There seems to be a lot of disagreement on whether 6/24 was actually closed (or just the ILS was OTS) at the time they made their approach. I sure hope it was, because if not, I really don't see why even attempt 18. Between a much shorter runway with no GS and a much longer one without one, I'd pick the longer one, especially since it would have offered a much shorter taxi. There is also disagreement on whether LOC 18 approach is legal at night, and here's why:

The Jepp chart in the notes section states: procedure NA at night when VGSI is inop (it wasn't), but then in the minima section it has a Night box that states NA.

The NOS chart, however, doesn't have a night box, so the consensus seems to be the Jepp chart is wrong since there apparently was an FDC notam to remove the night NA restriction.

I have to wonder is either crewmember had been to BHM before. I can tell you that if it were me and 6/24 was closed, I would have requested RNAV to 36, especially with winds calm gusting to 4. Much less terrain in that direction, much overall easier approach. I can't help but think had they been more familiar with the airport, they would have done the same. Would have added 10 minutes to the flight, but so what, they're paid by the minute.

Overall, seems a very unnecessary accident.

[Gabriel]

To sumarize some facts, as disclosed by the NTSB:
The first point of impact was 0.8 NM before the RWY 18 threshold, along the extended centerline.
7 seconds before impact there was a "sink rate, sink rate" GPWS warning.
4 seconds before impact one of the pilots called "Runway in sight".
At the impact, they were flying with the AP and AT on, the speed was 140ks which is consistent with the expected approach speed, the flight controls and engines were responding normally.
The PAPI to RWY 18 was working ok and was accurate.

The above seems to suggest that:
They were not following an FMS-generated glide slope.
It was a CFIT, nothing wrong with the plane, and they never knew that they were going to crash.
The approach was not fully stabilized (the sink rate warning means that the sink rate was more than 1000fpm, which violates the stabilized approach criteria below 1000ft).
Intentionally or not, they busted minimums ("Runway in sight" 4 seconds before impact).

Questions:
Wasn't an EGPWS installed and working in that A300? I guess that the "look ahead" feature of the EGPWS would have "noted" that they were about to "land" way short of the runway, and triggered some wariing (terrain, pull up, or something).
Wasn't the A300 fitted with the necessary avionics to generate a "virtual" glide slope?
Why didn't they go-around at the MDA? Maybe a wrong altimeter setting?
Why there is nor reference (so far) to standard calls from the GPWS? (five hundred, minimums, one hundred, fifty, forty...)

I prepared this form the NTSB's information, from Google Earth for the terrain, from the LOC approach plate (the RNAV/GPS one would have been the same) and from FlightAware for the flight path (plus the impact point). Beware that the FlightAware data is too sparse, and it's not always very accurate. In particular, the last seconds of the approach happened in the last portion of the last segment, between the last FlightAware point and the impact point. I expect this part to be not straight, because the fact that the "sink rate" sounded and then became silent means that the sink rate diminished after the warning.

[3WE]

...Overall, seems a very unnecessary accident.

Amazing post Flyboy. If runway 18 is as bad as you say, it makes me ask if some 'firewall' should not have been in place way ahead of time? Something in airport information, or guidance from ATC, or something in an op's manual at UPS...Runway 18 not recommended for heavy aircraft or night operation in airport information or on the approach plate?...someting?

Is it really a deal of a new crew and runway is short but ok and 'any approach flown properly' should give you your safety buffers and it's not like we're in the rocky mountains, it's Alabama for gosh sakes...

I know there is some terrain depicted on the approach plate, and a slightly steep angle, but what's there to clue you in- San Diego's at least a little bit impressive too?

Conversely, there's several examples of runways and approaches that do require special training, etc...

But anyone can fly in and 'sign up' for the localizer to 18?

No dispute on the post, just a little amazement that it seems like such a bad idea after reading your comments.

[flyboy2548m]

Amazing post Flyboy. If runway 18 is as bad as you say, it makes me ask if some 'firewall' should not have been in place way ahead of time? Something in airport information, or guidance from ATC, or something in an op's manual at UPS...Runway 18 not recommended for heavy aircraft or night operation in airport information or on the approach plate?...someting?

Is it really a deal of a new crew and runway is short but ok and 'any approach flown properly' should give you your safety buffers and it's not like we're in the rocky mountains, it's Alabama for gosh sakes...

I know there is some terrain depicted on the approach plate, and a slightly steep angle, but what's there to clue you in- San Diego's at least a little bit impressive too?

Conversely, there's several examples of runways and approaches that do require special training, etc...

But anyone can fly in and 'sign up' for the localizer to 18?

No dispute on the post, just a little amazement that it seems like such a bad idea after reading your comments.

To answer your last question, yes, anyone can request and fly LOC Rwy 18 approach unless the operator in question's SOP prohibits it. I know of at least one airline who restricts that runway to day VFR ops only, however neither my current airline nor the previous one had such a restriction. We just never landed on it, there was no need to, unless the winds rendered 6/24 unusable, which never happened to me.

KBHM is a special airport which uses familiarization charts, but the one for Rwy 18 mentions next to nothing as far as arrival thereon is concerned, and mostly discusses obstacle clearance on departure.

I would like to know a couple of things:

1. Firstly, I would like to know what the ATIS report was at the time of their arrival, specifically with regards to runways.

2. If Rwy 24 was available, whose idea was Rwy 18? Approach controller's or the crew's?

3. I would very much like to hear a recording of their approach briefing, I have a feeling that would be a crucial piece of this puzzle.

4. I would like to know what UPS's SOPs are for flying such an approach with or without VNAV.

[Gabriel]

1. Firstly, I would like to know what the ATIS report was at the time of their arrival, specifically with regards to runways.
2. If Rwy 24 was available, whose idea was Rwy 18? Approach controller's or the crew's?

I don't know about the ATIS, but the NTSB reported that runway 06/24 was closed at the time of the accident for maintenance of runway center line lights.

3. I would very much like to hear a recording of their approach briefing, I have a feeling that would be a crucial piece of this puzzle.
4. I would like to know what UPS's SOPs are for flying such an approach with or without VNAV.

Me too.

[flyboy2548m]

I don't know about the ATIS, but the NTSB reported that runway 06/24 was closed at the time of the accident for maintenance of runway center line lights.

I know exactly what the NTSB reported, thanks.

[3WE]

....ATIS....

....ATIS....

Wow...the subtleties here.

A new crew, not truly familiar with BHM and the winds are from the south and the ATIS says LOC approach to runway 18 in use.

I'm betting the typical crew lands on 18.

Tough questions- should ATC have suggested 36? or should the crew have been more like Flyboy and preferred 36?

or should they have just paid closer attention to altitudes and fixes and missed approach points/procedures?

[flyboy2548m]

Wow...the subtleties here.

A new crew, not truly familiar with BHM and the winds are from the south and the ATIS says LOC approach to runway 18 in use.

I'm betting the typical crew lands on 18.

Tough questions- should ATC have suggested 36? or should the crew have been more like Flyboy and preferred 36?

or should they have just paid closer attention to altitudes and fixes and missed approach points/procedures?

Well, we don't know if it was a crew not familiar with the airport, but you're correct in that too often crews aren't very proactive. At zero-dark-thirty there isn't much traffic at BHM (there isn't all that much traffic there period, but that's beside the point), so I can't imagine 36 would have been a problem, had they requested it.

[ocelot]

Gabriel: what's the average descent rate in the final segment of that chart? it looks to me like around 1200 fpm (based on losing a bit under 150 feet in the last 7 seconds)... which is kind of high. Since they apparently weren't getting sink rate callouts the whole time, when they did the descent must have been quite steep indeed. Makes me wonder if they were too high and did something foolish to try to get back onto the glideslope. Also makes me wonder about wind shear. And about effects caused by the wind blowing up the hill.

[Gabriel]

Gabriel: what's the average descent rate in the final segment of that chart? it looks to me like around 1200 fpm (based on losing a bit under 150 feet in the last 7 seconds)... which is kind of high.

That's trying to get too much information from the little data we have. The "flight profile" depicted is in fact very few isolated dots (data points) that were then artificially joined with straight lines that do not necessarily represent the truth.

Since they apparently weren't getting sink rate callouts the whole time, when they did the descent must have been quite steep indeed.

We know that they received a double "sink rate" warning 7 seconds before the crash. No other instance of this warning were mentioned so far, but that doesn't necessarily mean that there weren't.

The "sink rate" warning is based on barometric vertical speed, not on variation of the altitude above the ground.
However, the threshold sink rate at which the warning is triggered is a function of the altitude above the ground (radar altitude): 1000fpm at zero ft AGL and 5000fpm at 2500ft. Look at this:



So, assuming that that was the only "sink rate" event, this means that they were in the white zone during all the approach except 7 seconds before the crash, where they briefly went a little bit into the orange zone and quickly got out of it again into the white. At impact they had were at less than 1000fpm.

[Gabriel]

I don't know about the ATIS, but the NTSB reported that runway 06/24 was closed at the time of the accident for maintenance of runway center line lights.

I know exactly what the NTSB reported, thanks.

So you were asking if runway 24 was closed or not just for the sports of it? Or you doubt about the accuracy of what the NTSB reported regarding this?