US Air Plane down in the Hudson River in NYC

[Giles]

nothing surprising;

http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/02/04/hudson ... index.html

(CNN) -- The National Transportation Safety Board said Wednesday that both engines of the US Airways flight that ditched last month into the Hudson River contained bird remains.

[Giles]

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... ching.html

Hudson A320: Partial engine power aided textbook ditching
By John Croft

Sources close to the on-going investigation of US Airways Flight 1549 say that the Airbus A320's number 1 (left) engine continued to run at approximately 35% fan speed (N1) during the three-minute window between striking birds at 3,200ft and ditching in the Hudson River on 15 January. All 150 passengers and five crew safely exited the Charlotte-bound aircraft in the river, aided by nearby ferry boat crews in a spectacle that captured global interest and fueled renewed admiration for airline training and professionalism.

Though limited, the left engine's speed would have been adequate to keep the aircraft's generators and hydraulic systems on-line, providing "normal" flight control laws and communications as well as giving pilots ability to deploy flaps and slats, elements that proved critical to performing a low-speed water landing. To maintain altitude on a single engine however, experts say the powerplant would have had to been running at 70% N1 or more.

Investigators planned to retrieve the left engine, which broke from the aircraft during the ditching, from the river bottom Friday or Saturday to perform an inspection. Flight International has learned that the aircraft touched down at 125-130kt airspeed with flaps and slats both in the "2" position, or midpoint, position. An A320 normally lands at 120-125kt with fully deployed flaps and slats.

The right engine, which remained attached to the aircraft after ditching, was apparently operating at only 15% fan speed, according to sources. Investigators afterward determined that the engine had received "soft body impact damage" to its first stage fan blades. In addition three variable guide vanes were fractured and two were missing. The engine's electronic control unit was missing and "numerous" internal components were "significantly" damaged, said the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in a 21 January update on the accident.

The NTSB says the organic material that was found in the right engine and on the wings and fuselage after the aircraft was lifted onto a barge will be identified through DNA analysis, and a feather found attached to the flap track on the wing was sent to the Smithsonian Institution for identification.

Officials have also confirmed that the A320's Hamilton Sundstrand-built ram air turbine (RAT) had deployed from its compartment near the root of the left wing during the event and that the Honeywell auxiliary power unit in the tail had been operating. Though the RAT will deploy automatically when engine or electric power drops below a threshold, pilots can also manually deploy the propeller-driven emergency system. The device provides power to one of three hydraulic systems onboard which would have given pilots the ability to deploy slats but not flaps.

Sources tell Flight International that the first officer had tried to relight the left engine during the descent, which averaged 1,000fpm rate, but that the engine did not respond other than to continue spinning at 35% N1. It's possible the pilots restarted the APU in order to have bleed air available to help restart the left engine as the A320's airspeed was relatively low.

Pilots review ditching procedures in textbooks during recurrent training but do not practice the events in simulators as there are no test-verified models available. Pilots do however practice double engine-out scenarios with a re-light afterward. NTSB has completed its interviews of the pilots, flight attendants and air traffic controllers and was working to wrap up its fact finding with passengers and a crew that two days earlier experienced a compressor stall on the accident aircraft. That event does not appear to be related to the 15 January accident.

Though US Airways provides all seats in its pre-America West merger A320s with life vests, which includes the accident aircraft, the former A320 captain says there would not have been time to fly and diagnose the aircraft in addition to alert the passengers to the situation and asking them to don the vests before landing. Pilots also did not activate the A320's "ditch" button which automatically configures the various valves and openings on the aircraft for ditching, a preparation the former A320 captain says is about three pages into the ditching checklist. "Some of the flight attendants didn’t even know they were going into the water," he says of the short window of opportunity during the descent. "There was not enough time for any of it."

[Dummy Pilot]

Apologies if these have already been posted, but here is a link to the FAA site that has files for aboth the audio and transcript versions of all ATC comms.

ATC comms audio/transcript

[Giles]

thanks! havent seen that before.

[monchavo]

Scribd did an embedded version

http://www.scribd.com/doc/11719666/Tracon-Transcript

[Rabbi O'Genius]

According to the transcript, the callsign (Cactus 1549) is incorrectly announced (1529 & 1539) on several occasions and by both parties. Though hardly a major issue here, I think that this is indicative of the stress of this kind of situation, and a reminder that much more serious errors have been made under the pressure of similar circumstances.....

[reubee]

2008:36 AWE1549 ground cactus ah fifteen forty nine spot twenty eight taxi please

2008:40 GC cactus fifteen forty nine laguardie ground runway ah four turn left alpha hold short of golf and ah did you call clearance

2008:48 AWE1549 ah sorry i forgot

Of all the days to forget ...

[Giles]

From the AP:

A spokesman for the National Air Traffic Controllers Union says the pilot reported a "double bird strike" about 30 to 45 seconds after takeoff and said he needed to return to LaGuardia. The controller instructed the pilot to divert to an airport in nearby Teterboro, N.J., for an emergency landing

Hang on a minute! If the pilot says he NEEDS to return why would the controller send him to an airport 11 miles away - an airport he could not reach???

According to what's been posted on the NATCA bulletin board, they initially wanted to turn back toward LGA, but the pilot then asked what airport that was beneath them, which was TEB. ATC then cleared them to land at TEB, which they didn't make either.

Interpreting every word printed in the media in its literal sense is always a mistake.

and as we can see from the transcripts the controller did not instruct the pilot to divert to teterboro instead of lga.

lesson learned- don't believe media / witness reports minutes after an accident.

[Half Bottle]

and as we can see from the transcripts the controller did not instruct the pilot to divert to teterboro instead of lga.

lesson learned- don't believe media / witness reports minutes after an accident.

Settle down there, Giles. You must be excited if you've graduated from one-word answers to actual sentence fragments!

[Giles]

and as we can see from the transcripts the controller did not instruct the pilot to divert to teterboro instead of lga.

lesson learned- don't believe media / witness reports minutes after an accident.

Settle down there, Giles. You must be excited if you've graduated from one-word answers to actual sentence fragments!

i cant please everyone!

[Digger]

lesson learned- don't believe media / witness reports minutes after an accident.

That is correct. But, Digger has some credibility...

[Dummy Pilot]

Of all the days to forget ...

reubee,

I know your comment is just 'tongue in cheek', but LGA has a silly little procedure where you are required to call clearance delivery during preflight. At 99% of other airports in the US, if your ACARs and the airport in question has the ability to send/receive PDCs (Predeparture Clearance), then you simply get a datalink version of your clearance and there is no need to speak to CLRNC DEL. If there are any changes to your clearance or climbout instructions after the PDC has been issued at most airports, Ground will pass it on or ask you to contact CLRNC for a reroute. LGA has PDC capability, but for whatever reason, after receiving your PDC they want you to call CLRNC and restate all the information that is printed on the PDC you are holding in your hand. It's a tremendous waste of time and unnecessarily clogs up the frequency....I have a feeling they do it that way because it's always been done like that and noone has sense enough to change it. Anyways, I've spent my whole career based in LGA and I know that you must call CLRNC even with a valid PDC....crews that are not based there often forget because it's not a common practice at other airports.....Hell, I forget from time to time.

The only redeeming feature of having to call CLRNC at LGA is getting to talk to Franklin. Franklin is a guy with a silky smooth voice who sounds like he should be a DJ for a jazz radio station. I'm told that he's like 65 years old and he's only allowed to work CLRNC and no other actual control positions in the tower. He's always making corny quips and wishing you a wonderful flight.

[Giles]

The crew will be on Larry King Feb 9th. 9pm EST

correction;
Tuesday Feb 10th.

[reubee]

Just saw the 60 minutes interview. "Did you pray?" "No I figured there was enough of that going on behind me" (paraphrase). Of all the dumb questions you could ask.

The thing that intrigued me, the lone stewardess at the rear seemed to be traumatised about the event. So why is there 2 cabin crew at the front and 1 at the rear. With the pilot and co-pilot at the front, there are effectively four at the front to manage those doors and one crew down the back.

[ZeroAltitude]

Source: http://www.avweb.com/eletter/archives/a ... tml#199735

USAir's Sullenberger: 'I Was Sure I Could Do It'

In his first major interview with the mainstream press Sunday night, USAir's Chesley B. Sullenberger described the moment after his Airbus 320 ingested birds as "the worst, sickening pit of your stomach, falling through the floor feeling I've ever felt in my life. I knew immediately it was very bad." In a 20-minute interview with CBS's Katie Couric on 60 Minutes, Sullenberger said he and F/O Jeff Skiles went through a brief moment of denial before getting to work of ditching the stricken USAir Flight 1549 in the Hudson River on January 15. "My initial reaction was one of disbelief this is happening. This doesn't happen to me," he told Couric, adding that he expected to finish his entire flying career without ever having lost an airplane. Sullenberger described the birdstrike impacts as "like a hailstorm…like the worst thunderstorm I'd ever experienced growing up in Texas." When he noticed the smell of burned birds passing through the air packs, Sullenberger realized the engines weren't going to restart, although he and Skiles selected continuous ignition and started the APU, which apparently provided power all the way to the ditching. "No luck. I mean, I got the AP running, I turned the ignition on, but still, no usable thrust. We were descending rapidly toward the water. The water was coming up at us fast," he told Couric.

Sullenberger was aware of at least one previous ditching gone bad—the 1996 ditching of a hijacked Air Ethiopia 767 in which 125 of 175 people died, largely because the airplane didn't touch down nose-up with wings level. "I needed to touch down with the wings exactly level. I needed to touch down with the nose slightly up. I needed to touch down at a descent rate that was survivable. And I needed to touch down just above our minimum flying speed but not below it. And I needed to make all these things happen simultaneously," he told Couric.

Once the airplane had impacted the water and come to rest, Sullenberger and Skiles turned to each other "and we said, 'Well, that wasn't as bad as I thought.'" However, flight attendant Doreen Welsh had a different experience from her seat in the rear of the cabin. "The back of the plane hit first…it was violent. Horrible. Things flew out," Welsh said. Although the evacuation was orderly, Welsh said there was "some panic in the back," but despite significant flooding, all of the 155 occupants of the airplane evacuated safely.

The FA's only had about 90 seconds warning that the aircraft was making an emergency touchdown and none realized they were going into the river. Welsh injured her leg either during the impact or evacuation and she told Couric she's still too traumatized to put her USAir uniform back on. Sullenberger credits the cabin crew and especially the boat handlers and first responders with making the evacuation a success. For CBS's full story, see http://www.cbsnews.com.

[aardvark2zz]

AWE1549 US AIRWAYS RADIUS OF GLIDE WITHIN LAGUARDIA AND TETERBORO. Glide down to 300 ft ASL from 2000 ft ASL turn point. 17.77km "glide".

Airports near markers 3 and 5.


.

[Putt4Par]

Just saw the 60 minutes interview. "Did you pray?" "No I figured there was enough of that going on behind me" (paraphrase). Of all the dumb questions you could ask.
.

I know....that was a dumb question. "Er, yes, Katie, for about 30 seconds I put my hands up in the air, closed my eyes, and prayed". Heaven forbid I am ever in an emergency situation in an airplane, I want the pilot to focus on the task at hand and try to land the airplane. I don't want him praying.

And, yes, that flight attendant seemed pretty upset. She's probably never going to fly again and don't be surprised if she sues US Airways for mental distress. She looked like she was ready to fight.

And I wish Katie would have asked some questions from the co-pilot. He barely said anything and I would have been interested to know what he thought, what he felt, etc...

That "Sully" has a dry personality, which is bad if you are an actor but good if you are a pilot or a surgeon

[Half Bottle]

And, yes, that flight attendant seemed pretty upset. She's probably never going to fly again and don't be surprised if she sues US Airways for mental distress. She looked like she was ready to fight.

I suppose I wouldn't be surprised if there were lawsuits (either from the F/A or pax) given our litigious society, but for the life of me I can't imagine how US Airways would be a defendant. Perhaps the engine manufacturer or the port authority (although the birds didn't seem to be on airport property from all we know so far).

On the subject of frivolous lawsuits, I just received notification that I am a potential party to a class-action suit brought against Lenscrafters by a woman who said their "50% off kids lenses and frames" was deceptive marketing because it was an all-the-time promotion and therefore the underlying price didn't exist and was just inflated in order to claim that it was half off of a higher number. In order to setlle the suit, Lenscrafters agreed to:

1) Send $15-off coupons to any customer who bought kids' glasses there in the last three years who requested relief under the settlement. If fewer than 5% of the affected customers responded, they would randomly send out coupons to equal 5%
2) The woman who brought the suit had her legal fees paid by Lenscrafters and received $2,500.00 from them on top of it.

The nature of that settlement tells me everything I need to know about the reason for the suit.

[GlennAB1]

They should all sue the parks department for locating a bird sanctuary so close to an airport!!!

[David Hilditch]

Re: aardvaark's chart/map, I am not sure how accurate this is. Is it each spot supposed to repesent the aircraft's track and height above ground ? If so, it's not correct, since the 300 feet marker is well to the south of where it actually ditched, so the 300 feet arc would have been further north, I think. The ditching took place a little to the north of the Intrepid carrier, which is at 46th Street - so let's say 48-50th Street. However, the 300 feet marker, at its most generous, cannot be north of around the 23rd-24th Street area. The point of impact, in my judgment, was about one third of the distance south from the 400 feet marker to the 300 feet marker. For reference, the street at the southerly base of Central Park is 59th.

Also, why did he climb 100 feet from 1200 to 1300 feet ? Just equipment readout inaccuracy ?

[Dmmoore]

Flightaware flight log shows flight 1549-15 was at 300' - 153 Knots at N40.74 W74.02. According to Google Earth, that's about even with West 22nd St. Touch down should have been between Pier 54 and 57. There are several video's of the splash taken by camera's in the area of the pier's. His data coorelates with Flightaware.

Time Position Ground
speed Altitude Facility
Eastern TZ Latitude Longitude kts Feet Location/Type
03:26PM 40.80 -73.87 151 1800 New York TRACON
03:27PM 40.83 -73.87 174 2800 New York TRACON
03:27PM 40.86 -73.88 194 3200 New York Center
03:28PM 40.88 -73.90 202 2000 New York TRACON
03:28PM 40.86 -73.93 215 1600 New York Center
03:29PM 40.83 -73.95 194 1200 New York TRACON
03:29PM 40.82 -73.97 191 1300 New York Center
03:30PM 40.78 -74.00 189 400 New York TRACON
03:31PM 40.75 -74.02 153 300 New York TRACON

[Sabre]

Re: aardvaark's chart/map, I am not sure how accurate this is. Is it each spot supposed to repesent the aircraft's track and height above ground ? If so, it's not correct, since the 300 feet marker is well to the south of where it actually ditched, so the 300 feet arc would have been further north, I think. The ditching took place a little to the north of the Intrepid carrier, which is at 46th Street - so let's say 48-50th Street. However, the 300 feet marker, at its most generous, cannot be north of around the 23rd-24th Street area. The point of impact, in my judgment, was about one third of the distance south from the 400 feet marker to the 300 feet marker. For reference, the street at the southerly base of Central Park is 59th.

Also, why did he climb 100 feet from 1200 to 1300 feet ? Just equipment readout inaccuracy ?

Come now, David, please do not question aardvark's charts, they are NEVER wrong; charts are his life

However, if they are found to be inaccurate; Cap'n Sully should be questioned as to why he didn't follow the path as reported by the chart-meister.

[David Hilditch]

Flightaware flight log shows flight 1549-15 was at 300' - 153 Knots at N40.74 W74.02. According to Google Earth, that's about even with West 22nd St. Touch down should have been between Pier 54 and 57. There are several video's of the splash taken by camera's in the area of the pier's.

That's not correct. There was film of the aircraft just after the ditching with the Intrepid in the background. Intrepid is at 46th Street, Pier 86. There was a strong southerly flowing current, which took the aircraft many blocks southward during the evacuation, but the initial splashdown was abeam 48th-50th Street.

[Dmmoore]

Flightaware flight log shows flight 1549-15 was at 300' - 153 Knots at N40.74 W74.02. According to Google Earth, that's about even with West 22nd St. Touch down should have been between Pier 54 and 57. There are several video's of the splash taken by camera's in the area of the pier's.

That's not correct. There was film of the aircraft just after the ditching with the Intrepid in the background. Intrepid is at 46th Street, Pier 86. There was a strong southerly flowing current, which took the aircraft many blocks southward during the evacuation, but the initial splashdown was abeam 48th-50th Street.

According to the daia published by Flightaware thr aircraft was above 300 but ltss than 400 feet passing the Big I.

[aardvark2zz]

Re: aardvaark's chart/map, I am not sure how accurate this is. Is it each spot supposed to repesent the aircraft's track and height above ground ? If so, it's not correct, since the 300 feet marker is well to the south of where it actually ditched, so the 300 feet arc would have been further north, I think. The ditching took place a little to the north of the Intrepid carrier, which is at 46th Street - so let's say 48-50th Street. However, the 300 feet marker, at its most generous, cannot be north of around the 23rd-24th Street area. The point of impact, in my judgment, was about one third of the distance south from the 400 feet marker to the 300 feet marker. For reference, the street at the southerly base of Central Park is 59th.

Also, why did he climb 100 feet from 1200 to 1300 feet ? Just equipment readout inaccuracy ?

The data is from flightaware.

Around the time of your post I finally found the location of the touch down pt which is near the Intrepid.

That means it's closer to the 400ft pt like u wrote. But it looks like the 2 airports can still be reached; even with the same flap schedule as actually flown (but gear up).

I wonder if all or some of the data pts just need to be shifted north (maybe) by the error which is around 2000 ft horiz, including the 2000ft ASL pt. In that case the 17.77 km "glide" possibly remains the same.
,