PIA A320 in Karachi: loss of power after GA, crashed in residential area during final approach

[Gabriel]

If you command the plane to turn left, turn right, climb or descend then it will do so .

Not always. Be it a Cessna, or even more an Airbus.

[Gabriel]

duplicated

[Gabriel]

I think we are getting closer to the truth

- The crew approach fast, perhaps they are distracted or misinformed, or one of them thinks the other will "do something about it"
- The flaps are incorrectly set due to rushing, confusion or simple incompetence - or even hubris and that a fast landing is "entirely within the envelope" - this of course is nonsense, but bear with me
- The gear lever is lowered too early and the plane responds by not lowering the gear as it deems speed too high - critically the gear does not then extend once the target speed is reached because "reasons" - the crew "had" to recycle the lever in order for the gear to descend, but neither was sufficiently experienced to realise this - or because such an obscure fact was lost to them
- The plane drags on the runway and - as I mentioned in my previous summary - the crew do not realise until it is far, far too late

the holes in the cheese are slowly appearing

I am starting to think that they never lowered the gear. Flyboy said that in the sim, if you lower the gear lever (and leave it down) while too fast the gear would not come down at first but eventually it will when you slow down. No recycle needed. By now I am going to speculate that the guys that designed the sim knew what they were doing and that is an accurate representation of what the real plane will do. So, if as you said they lowered the gear lever while going to fast, the gear would have eventually extended itself when they slowed down below 250 knots, well in advance to touchdown. Since the gear was not extended, my conclusion is that the lever was not lowered (or was lowered early and too fast and brought back up before they slowed down enough).

Then you mentioned the flaps. For most of the approach they were too fast for any flap setting other than 1. At the very end of the approach they had slowed down to 115 kts which is barely enough to be within the envelope of 1+F (I don't understand this 1 and 1+F stuff, the flaps lever doesn't have a 1+F position, I think) which is not a landing flaps setting (you still have flaps 2, 3 and full, but they were too fast for those even over the threshold). So either they didn't lower the flaps because they were too fast or they attempted to do so but, once again, the plane refused because they were too fast (and I understand that this is one of the condition that would trigger the master warning that we hear when they acknowledge the landing clearance), and while losing a gear door may be not so critical, losing a flap can be unrecoverably deadly.

[3WE]

Gabieeee: I am starting to think that they never lowered the gear. Flyboy said...

Verbal said "Fuel shortage".

It still does not explain a wheels-up landing, but it does explain staying high and clean for a LLLLOOOONNNNGGGG time.

You'd think there would be flight recorders that might give insight into stuff like that...

[flyboy2548m]

(I don't understand this 1 and 1+F stuff)

How is this possible? You? Gabriel the Great doesn't understand this? Surely this can't be.

[Gabriel]

How is this possible? You? Gabriel the Great doesn't understand this? Surely this can't be.

Just like anybody, there are some things that I know better than other things, and it is a whole spectrum from being an expert to not even knowing that the thing exists. Just like anybody.

And Airbus systems are among the things I don't know particularly well.

Now ask me about the Tomahawk's system and you will see.

[3WE]

Now ask me about the Tomahawk's system and you will see.

For this incident, I think it's human systems that we might need to understand...don't know, just a guess.

But you know me, always rationalizing for the pilots...

[flyboy2548m]

Just like anybody, there are some things that I know better than other things, and it is a whole spectrum from being an expert to not even knowing that the thing exists. Just like anybody.

And Airbus systems are among the things I don't know particularly well.

Now ask me about the Tomahawk's system and you will see.

It's not even that, it's more that you actually admit it that's shocking.

[3WE]

1 vs 1+F

Quirky, but I guess the engineers thought it was a good idea and I sort of get it.

Still doesn’t explain the seemingly unaddressed highness and hotness.

[monchavo]

the holes in the cheese are slowly appearing

There's this thing called "the landing checklist" stuff like, "gear down, three green"..."flaps, set"..."speed checks".

I'm not saying it's not GROSS incompetence- but they screwd up soooo many obvious things.

Gabe's new stall thing had lots of GOOFY ideas, but they served him OK for a lot of hours of flight, these guys blew LOTS of BIG things as opposed to lots of little things.

I recognise and acknowledge that - if you recall my first set of speculative comments I was interested in the presence of an unknown factor - distracting, distressing or somehow impacting the actions of the pilots which led to this chain of events.

- A human factor (disagreement, cultural issue, something impacting their emotional state, the presence of a third party in the cockpit authorised or not)
- A physical factor (discombobulation by poisoning, lack of oxygen) affecting judgement
- A mechanical factor (an unrevealed issue with the airframe, a lack of fuel)

Verbal has thrown the troll flamebait out there about a lack of fuel - and if I extrapolate -

- the crew recognised this, took actions which they believed would get them to the airfield
- they were worried, they didn't want to "admit" they were low on fuel
- they operated outside of the guidance which I assume is in place for this circumstance and made the plane "slippery" in order to get to the runway
- during this course of action the overload of trying to prepare the plane for a safe landing meant they rushed their actions, resulting in either not lowering the gear handle or lowering it and the command was rejected (and then not implemented when the speed was achieved)

[3WE]

Monchie: the holes in the cheese are slowly appearing

3BS: Disconcur, Blah, Blah, Blah

Monchie: I recognise and acknowledge that - if you recall my first set of speculative comments...
Verbal has thrown the troll flamebait out there about a lack of fuel - and if I extrapolate -

- the crew recognised this, took actions which they believed would get them to the airfield
- they were worried, they didn't want to "admit" they were low on fuel
- they operated outside of the guidance which I assume is in place for this circumstance and made the plane "slippery" in order to get to the runway
- during this course of action the overload of trying to prepare the plane for a safe landing meant they rushed their actions, resulting in either not lowering the gear handle or lowering it and the command was rejected (and then not implemented when the speed was achieved)

Your bottom comments resonate with me, AND ALSO are laden with both competence and plausibility questions...

Snarcasm aside, appreciate the discussion.

Now...how about some CVR and FDR data.

[Gabriel]

3we, you were right...

If you coming too high and too fast, why wouldn't you extend the gear if only for the sake of adding drag and help on your crazy attempt to salvage a highly unstabilzed approach?

And that's what they did. They lowered the gear when 7200ft AGL and 10.5 miles out (where they should have been at 2700ft for a 3.deg slope) while doing 250 knots, and they puzzlingly RETRACTED it back when they intercepted the 3-deg slope at 1700ft and 5 miles out, while still doing 250 knt.

No technical failure whatsoever before the 1st landing. But a lot of disregard for any remotely reasonable safety practice.
These pilots were incredibly reckless. Will be hard to find another accident that show this level of disregard, negligence and overconfidence.

https://www.caapakistan.com.pk/Upload/S ... IB-431.pdf

[monchavo]

3we, you were right...

If you coming too high and too fast, why wouldn't you extend the gear if only for the sake of adding drag and help on your crazy attempt to salvage a highly unstabilzed approach?

And that's what they did. They lowered the gear when 7200ft AGL and 10.5 miles out (where they should have been at 2700ft for a 3.deg slope) while doing 250 knots, and they puzzlingly RETRACTED it back when they intercepted the 3-deg slope at 1700ft and 5 miles out, while still doing 250 knt.

No technical failure whatsoever before the 1st landing. But a lot of disregard for any remotely reasonable safety practice.
These pilots were incredibly reckless. Will be hard to find another accident that show this level of disregard, negligence and overconfidence.

https://www.caapakistan.com.pk/Upload/S ... IB-431.pdf

What we don't yet understand is what caused this remarkable recklessness. The triggers in my previous post is what I find fascinating

[Gabriel]

3we, you were right...

If you coming too high and too fast, why wouldn't you extend the gear if only for the sake of adding drag and help on your crazy attempt to salvage a highly unstabilzed approach?

And that's what they did. They lowered the gear when 7200ft AGL and 10.5 miles out (where they should have been at 2700ft for a 3.deg slope) while doing 250 knots, and they puzzlingly RETRACTED it back when they intercepted the 3-deg slope at 1700ft and 5 miles out, while still doing 250 knt.

No technical failure whatsoever before the 1st landing. But a lot of disregard for any remotely reasonable safety practice.
These pilots were incredibly reckless. Will be hard to find another accident that show this level of disregard, negligence and overconfidence.

https://www.caapakistan.com.pk/Upload/S ... IB-431.pdf

What we don't yet understand is what caused this remarkable recklessness. The triggers in my previous post is what I find fascinating

I don't know the answer, but...

• Extreme overconfidence (feeling invincible or that this will not happen to you because you are better than the rest) and a totally garbage company safety culture will for sure be a big part of that.

• All the ones you listed in your previous post are crossed out.

[3WE]

3we, you were right...They lowered the gear when 7200ft AGL and 10.5 miles out...and they puzzlingly RETRACTED it back when they intercepted the 3-deg slope at 1700ft and 5 miles out, while still doing 250 knots.

No technical failure whatsoever before the 1st landing.

Parlour ass-hat speculation:

Rectocranial inversion (flyboy diagnosed ME with it)...We're on the glideslope, let's retract the spoilers, so someone reaches down without really thinking and flips a lever.

Now, why didn't the landing checklist, gear-down-three-green thingie catch it better? I dunno...

I'm glad to hear that they weren't TOTAL idiots- rather inconceivable to dive all the way with no drag efforts.

Repeating (as I have many times), I always loved PLAYING hot and high...In 172 school when a biz-jet landed, We would cross the threshold at pattern altitude, dump the 40-degree 172 flapies and dive for the ground. (6000 ft runway)...

I THINK we usually made the mid-field turnoff.

[monchavo]

• All the ones you listed in your previous post are crossed out.

A human factor (disagreement, cultural issue, something impacting their emotional state, the presence of a third party in the cockpit authorised or not)
- A physical factor (discombobulation by poisoning, lack of oxygen) affecting judgement
- A mechanical factor (an unrevealed issue with the airframe, a lack of fuel)

Wrong.

[Gabriel]

All the ones you listed in your previous post are crossed out.

A human factor (disagreement, cultural issue, something impacting their emotional state, the presence of a third party in the cockpit authorised or not)
- A physical factor (discombobulation by poisoning, lack of oxygen) affecting judgement
- A mechanical factor (an unrevealed issue with the airframe, a lack of fuel)

Wrong.

Ok, WILL be crossed out.
They were discussing the COVID situation and, after they ATC told them to discontinue the approach because they were too high and they insisted to continue, the did continue.... talking about the COVID situation.

How compatible is that with a daring mechanical situation or medical/mental condition other than gross stupidity and complete disregard for human life?

[monchavo]

All the ones you listed in your previous post are crossed out.

A human factor (disagreement, cultural issue, something impacting their emotional state, the presence of a third party in the cockpit authorised or not)
- A physical factor (discombobulation by poisoning, lack of oxygen) affecting judgement
- A mechanical factor (an unrevealed issue with the airframe, a lack of fuel)

Wrong.

Ok, WILL be crossed out.
They were discussing the COVID situation and, after they ATC told them to discontinue the approach because they were too high and they insisted to continue, the did continue.... talking about the COVID situation.

How compatible is that with a daring mechanical situation or medical/mental condition other than gross stupidity and complete disregard for human life?

That is the human factor I described. Distraction. Dereliction of duty.

[Gabriel]

That is the human factor I described. Distraction. Dereliction of duty.

Ok, let me step back a bit. When you say:

What we don't yet understand is what caused this remarkable recklessness.

What of all that happened do you mean with "this remarkable recklessness"?

Because bringing the landing gear back up and not doing the checklist may have been caused by the distraction, but in turn the distraction was caused by rushing and trying to salvage a forbidden unstabilized approach while discussing COVID and getting a myriad of alarms, all of which in turn was caused by "this remarkable recklessness".

Are we going in circles? Let's see...

You say that "this remarkable recklessness" was caused bu "dereliction of duty". Isn't dereliction of duty during approach and landing a remarkable recklessness in itself?

[monchavo]

That is the human factor I described. Distraction. Dereliction of duty.

Ok, let me step back a bit. When you say:

What we don't yet understand is what caused this remarkable recklessness.

What of all that happened do you mean with "this remarkable recklessness"?

Because bringing the landing gear back up and not doing the checklist may have been caused by the distraction, but in turn the distraction was caused by rushing and trying to salvage a forbidden unstabilized approach while discussing COVID and getting a myriad of alarms, all of which in turn was caused by "this remarkable recklessness".

Are we going in circles? Let's see...

You say that "this remarkable recklessness" was caused bu "dereliction of duty". Isn't dereliction of duty during approach and landing a remarkable recklessness in itself?

Yes. It is. I am suggesting that there might have been something else, as yet undiscovered or not revealed which made them behave in this reckless fashion on this occasion.

[Gabriel]

That is the human factor I described. Distraction. Dereliction of duty.

Ok, let me step back a bit. When you say:

What we don't yet understand is what caused this remarkable recklessness.

What of all that happened do you mean with "this remarkable recklessness"?

Because bringing the landing gear back up and not doing the checklist may have been caused by the distraction, but in turn the distraction was caused by rushing and trying to salvage a forbidden unstabilized approach while discussing COVID and getting a myriad of alarms, all of which in turn was caused by "this remarkable recklessness".

Are we going in circles? Let's see...

You say that "this remarkable recklessness" was caused bu "dereliction of duty". Isn't dereliction of duty during approach and landing a remarkable recklessness in itself?

Yes. It is. I am suggesting that there might have been something else, as yet undiscovered or not revealed which made them behave in this reckless fashion on this occasion.

Yes, it is possible. But my bet is that the only difference between "this occasion" and previous ones is that this one ended up bad.
Had they not landed with the gear up, we would have never heard of this story which would still have been a horror story.
How many horror stories did these pilots make before? I don't know if we will ever know.

[monchavo]

Yes, it is possible. But my bet is that the only difference between "this occasion" and previous ones is that this one ended up bad.
Had they not landed with the gear up, we would have never heard of this story which would still have been a horror story.
How many horror stories did these pilots make before? I don't know if we will ever know.

And that is why we should look to the fuller investigation to understand the wider evidence pool - and I think that's likely because negligence claim will invoke lawyers and investigations. PIA may decide to look into the data (if any exists) about similar flights these pilots were undertaking and then corporately disown their actions if they believe they had two (more?) rogue elements. i am still interested to understand if there was a breakdown in CRM because of a cultural, social, political or circumstantial event during the flight.

[3WE]

Apologies- no time to dig too deep on this.

1. Still no actual voice transcript THAT WE CAN READ?

2. It sounds as if the "unbelievability" of the pilots actions has only increased.

3. Given that, I am with Monchie in wondering about the pilots being compromised/intoxicated (this includes gas poisoning). (Am I correct that Monchie is asking that?)

I read that they actually retracted the spoilers later so my wild-ass theory that the gear up was INTENDED to be spoilers down seems a bit more remote...then again, with bad CRM one guy might have retracted the spoilers (gear) and then later, the OTHER guy retracted the spoilers (actually).

[3WE]

No delete option.

[J]

PIA, Pakistan's national airline, has grounded a third of its pilots for having fake licenses

Islamabad, Pakistan (CNN) — Pakistan's national carrier has grounded almost a third of its pilots after a government investigation revealed that hundreds across the country had fake licenses and were not qualified to fly.

In a letter to the government Friday, Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) said 141 of its 450 pilots will not be "utilized for any flying duties" as they had "suspicious licenses."

The letter -- sent by PIA General Manager Syed Qamar Maqbool -- was shared with CNN on Monday by the company's spokesperson, Abdullah Khan.

On Wednesday last week, Pakistan Aviation Minister Ghulam Sarwar Khan said 262 pilots in the country "did not take the exam themselves" and had paid someone else to sit it on their behalf.

"They don't have flying experience," he said.

Pakistan has 860 active pilots serving its domestic airlines -- including PIA -- as well as a number of foreign carriers, Khan said.

* * *
https://edition.cnn.com/travel/article ... index.html