NASA faults equipment in Columbia shuttle disaster
NASA faults equipment in Columbia shuttle disaster - CNN.com
Reports:
http://i.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2008/images ... le.pt1.pdf
http://i.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2008/images ... le.pt2.pdf
http://i.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2008/images ... le.pt3.pdf
http://i.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2008/images ... le.pt4.pdf
Don't Miss
* NASA Columbia report, part 1
* NASA Columbia report, part 2
* NASA Columbia report, part 3
* NASA Columbia report, part 4
news video report on CNN:
NASA faults equipment in Columbia shuttle disaster - CNN.com
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NASA faults equipment in Columbia shuttle disaster
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NASA faults equipment in Columbia shuttle disaster
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Re: NASA faults equipment in Columbia shuttle disaster
The short version in the media was a little bit troubling.
It listed some shortcomings of the safety-wear, but also said that the Columbia disaster was not survivable.
If I read it right- perhaps they were rendered unconscious when depressurization occured, and maybe had some other physical injuries since their helmets are not anchored like the newer NASCAR ones and other restraint failures.
So do we assume if they had better pressure suits, restraints and anchored helmets, they could have enjoyed more of the ride and getting burned alive???
No arguement that there area always things to be learned and improved, and that maybe there are other scenarios where the equipment could make a difference, but it's still tough to survive when things go wrong at such speeds- so no easy answers!
It listed some shortcomings of the safety-wear, but also said that the Columbia disaster was not survivable.
If I read it right- perhaps they were rendered unconscious when depressurization occured, and maybe had some other physical injuries since their helmets are not anchored like the newer NASCAR ones and other restraint failures.
So do we assume if they had better pressure suits, restraints and anchored helmets, they could have enjoyed more of the ride and getting burned alive???
No arguement that there area always things to be learned and improved, and that maybe there are other scenarios where the equipment could make a difference, but it's still tough to survive when things go wrong at such speeds- so no easy answers!
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Re: NASA faults equipment in Columbia shuttle disaster
The short version in the media was a little bit troubling.
It listed some shortcomings of the safety-wear, but also said that the Columbia disaster was not survivable.
If I read it right- perhaps they were rendered unconscious when depressurization occured, and maybe had some other physical injuries since their helmets are not anchored like the newer NASCAR ones and other restraint failures.
So do we assume if they had better pressure suits, restraints and anchored helmets, they could have enjoyed more of the ride and getting burned alive???
No arguement that there area always things to be learned and improved, and that maybe there are other scenarios where the equipment could make a difference, but it's still tough to survive when things go wrong at such speeds- so no easy answers!
This is the first report that I'm aware of whose purpose was not to deal with the causes of the disaster, but rather with the sequence and the nature of the events that took place once things started going wrong. The team states in numerous places that one of their goals was to figure out what sort of design features and crew procedures can and should be incorporated into future orbiters.
I found this line on page XX of the preface particularly telling:
This echoes what an older friend of mine likes to say, which is "there are times to try to avoid a crash and there are times to try to mitigate it". The report suggests that there is not sufficient training for crews to discern when it's too late to try and save the ship and start saving themselves.
Space shuttle crew training should include greater emphasis on the transition between problem-solving
and survival operations.
For example, on page 1-71 the report states that they found evidence that at 14:00:05 GMT (13 seconds before breakup), pilot W. McCool was apparently trying to restart the APUs in an attempt to regain hydraulic pressure and with it control of the orbiter. He had no way of knowing that the APUs were the least of his problems and that even had he regained they hydraulic systems, 13 seconds later he would have had a disintegrating ship with good hydro pressure (hardly of any use).
I also found it interesting that after the crew module separated at 14:00:18, it remained pressurized until 14:00:35. Theoretically, that's 17 seconds during which to don their face shields and activate emergency O2. It would take another 18 seconds (until 14:00:53) for the crew module itself to start breaking up, an event that was obviously not survivable. Of course, for those first 18 seconds they had little to no situational awareness (all displays went dark, the capsule was rotating), so I agree they were doomed pretty much no matter what.
But perhaps future crews won't be.
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