Air Safety Discussion Forum
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. And another nice classic gone ...As you know, I'm not a big fan of "vintage aircraft operators", but I still think we should wait for the FINAL REPORT.Is maintaining and flying classics (and selling rides) reckless tomfoolery? The CRM and checklists are solely lacking on acronyms for electronic wizardry.
The use of periods there...Quote = ATLCrew
True enough, but it's not like Tante Ju is exactly an awesome performer even with all three running. At sea level. On a cold day.
LHB tires of the wait. Indeed a sad story, and 3BS (pseudo double post) thinks a clear cause is unlikely to be found.*** but I still think we should wait for the FINAL REPORT.***
https://www.sust.admin.ch/inhalte/AV-be ... -HOT_E.pdfAs you know, I'm not a big fan of "vintage aircraft operators", but I still think we should wait for the FINAL REPORT.
Gotta love Swiss efficiency. STSB duty officer was notified within seven MINUTES of the crash.https://www.sust.admin.ch/inhalte/AV-be ... -HOT_E.pdfAs you know, I'm not a big fan of "vintage aircraft operators", but I still think we should wait for the FINAL REPORT.
Served.
His ability to pull things out of his ass continues to amaze. I thought ATL Crewie's response was pretty subdued.So this is where Evan came up with cowboy monkey military pilots systematically disregard procedure.
Subdued- yes. Effective in breaking through- no.His ability to pull things out of his ass continues to amaze. I thought ATL Crewie's response was pretty subdued.So this is where Evan came up with cowboy monkey military pilots systematically disregard procedure.
Certainly was! The report is damning of both the operator and the crew, and makes clear that the crew was trained well enough to know better.Not that this crash might be the result of some negligence.
Amen. Do I have your permission to copy this and paste it there?Certainly was! The report is damning of both the operator and the crew, and makes clear that the crew was trained well enough to know better.Not that this crash might be the result of some negligence.
Yeah, STSB's review of operations found that the crews apparently disregarding procedure were primarily the ex-AF ones. But it's silly to generalize about military pilots from 16 people, mostly trained in the same era (80s or earlier), by the same air force, now working at the same operator. Seems more plausible that the culture described at Ju-Air encouraged a 'type'...
What did Evanie say of that?The flight crew was accustomed to not complying with recognised rules for safe flight operations and taking high risks.
Indeed not. Lest there be repercussive acts.Don’t be linking or pointing them to here.
I think that you will find the answer to that question in the AvHerald article that you just read.- It is disappointing that two experienced chaps didn't apparently see the danger and act appropriately. The report doesnt make clear if this was something they'd done lots of times and "simply got lucky" or if they genuinely understood the risk factor of what they were doing
The investigation identified the following direct causal factors of the accident:
- The flight crew piloted the aircraft in a very high-risk manner by navigating it into a narrow valley at low altitude and with no possibility of an alternative flight path.
The investigation identified the following factors as directly contributing to the accident:
- The flight crew was accustomed to not complying with recognised rules for safe flight operations and taking high risks.
The investigation identified the following factors as systemically contributing to the accident:
- In particular, the air operator’s flight crews who were trained as Air Force pilots seemed to be accustomed to systematically failing to comply with generally recognised aviation rules and to taking high risks when flying Ju 52 aircraft.
- Numerous incidents, including several serious incidents, were not reported to the competent bodies and authorities. This meant that they were unable to take measures to improve safety.
In the last two months prior to the accident flight, pilot B carried out a total of 41 flights on the accident type; 28 of these were with pilot A, who carried out the accident flight with him.
In the months and years prior to the accident flight, various safety-critical flights had been documented on which pilot B had been part of the crew, flying below a safe altitude or taking high risks. Between April 2018 and including the day of the accident, at least eight flights have been logged which involved flight paths with a risk score of 8 to 10 (see section A1.18.4); on four of these flights, he was working with pilot A.
During his last line check on 12 May 2018, pilot B flew significantly below the safety altitudes as specified in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) VFR guide. Furthermore, he disregarded essential principles for safe mountain flying. These principles have been published since 1981 and, at the time of the accident, were listed under RAC 6-3 in the AIP VFR guide. The Ju-Air training captain who was entrusted to carry out pilot B’s line check and also worked as a ground instructor for the air operator, rated the flight as ‘high standard’. The choice of flight path was described as “considerate” and “anticipatory”.
During a climb in sister aircraft HB-HOP on 6 July 2013, pilot B as commander, together with pilot A in the role of co-pilot at the time, entered the basin south-west of Piz Segnas in a similar manner to during the accident flight and flew over the ridge of the Segnes pass at approximately 30 m above ground.
During this flight, a 180-degree turn or an alternative flight path in the northern section of the basin south-west of Piz Segnas would not have been possible.
It’s too bad that we don’t have anyone here with that sort of wisdom and insight....but it's not like Tante Ju is exactly an awesome performer even with all three running. At sea level. On a cold day.
I missed this portion, thanks for bringing it to my attention.
- Numerous incidents, including several serious incidents, were not reported to the competent bodies and authorities. This meant that they were unable to take measures to improve safety.
That portion? I thought this portion was much more relevant to your question:I missed this portion, thanks for bringing it to my attention.
- Numerous incidents, including several serious incidents, were not reported to the competent bodies and authorities. This meant that they were unable to take measures to improve safety.
In the months and years prior to the accident flight, various safety-critical flights had been documented on which pilot B had been part of the crew, flying below a safe altitude or taking high risks. Between April 2018 and including the day of the accident, at least eight flights have been logged which involved flight paths with a risk score of 8 to 10 (see section A1.18.4); on four of these flights, he was working with pilot A.
During his last line check on 12 May 2018, pilot B flew significantly below the safety altitudes as specified in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) VFR guide. Furthermore, he disregarded essential principles for safe mountain flying. These principles have been published since 1981 and, at the time of the accident, were listed under RAC 6-3 in the AIP VFR guide. The Ju-Air training captain who was entrusted to carry out pilot B’s line check and also worked as a ground instructor for the air operator, rated the flight as ‘high standard’. The choice of flight path was described as “considerate” and “anticipatory”.
During a climb in sister aircraft HB-HOP on 6 July 2013, pilot B as commander, together with pilot A in the role of co-pilot at the time, entered the basin south-west of Piz Segnas in a similar manner to during the accident flight and flew over the ridge of the Segnes pass at approximately 30 m above ground.
During this flight, a 180-degree turn or an alternative flight path in the northern section of the basin south-west of Piz Segnas would not have been possible.